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ADVERSE POSSESSION-ACTS CONSTITUTING-PAYMENT OF TAXES.-
FJTZSIMONS V. ATHERTON, 124 PAC. (CAL.), 250.-Held, that one who has
been in the continued adverse possession of a tract, but who has never-
paid any taxes, does not acquire title by adverse possession.
The object of the State is to collect taxes from everyone who claims
title to land, and if claimants of hostile titles would protect the titles they
claim, they must pay taxes. State v. Law, 46 W. Va., 451. And title by
ad verse possession cannot be maintained by one who has failed to pay the-
taxes on the property so claimed. Tuffree v. Polhenmus, 108 Cal., 670;
Rodrigute. v. Priest, 59 Tex. Cr. Rep., 248. But the mere paying of the
taxes is not enough to constitute adverse possession. Dickinson v. Bales,
59 Kan., 224. The above cases hold that the payment of taxes is an ele-
ment of adverse possession in the absence of statutes. This is the majority
view. The minority line of cases holds that payment of taxes is not an
element of adverse possession unless made so by express statutory require-
inent. Even where it is the fault of the claimant that the land was not
assessed. Coonradt v. Hill, 79 Cal., 587. In a suit to recover lands the-
defendant could avail himself of the statute of limitations although he
had not paid the taxes on the land during the running thereof. Anderson
v. Canter, 10 Kan. App., 167. For possession ripens into title whether-
claimant pays taxes or not. Sil'erstone z,. Hanley, 55 Wash., 458. For a
complete list of statutes covering this point, see Washburn on Real Prop-
erty, 6th Ed., Vol. 3, pp. 148-163. It would seem to be the better rule
that in the absence of statute, non-payment of taxes should not defeat the.
claim of title by adverse possession. The State is amply protected by its
power to sell the land for taxes, and the claim may well be adverse to the
owner, though the disseisor fails to pay the taxes. Under the rule es-
tblished in the principal case, the State might be enabled to collect taxes on.
the same land from several different claimants.
DAIMAGES-MIENTAL ANG'ISL.-HENRY V. SOUTHERN Rv:. Co., 75 S. F.
(l.Nm.), 1018.-Held, that in the absence of statute, damages for mental
aguish cannot be recovered in an action for injuries to personal property.
Pain of mind is not the subject of damages in the absence of bodily
iniury; Morse v. Duncan, 14 Fed., 396; Sunmmnerfield v. 17. U. Tel. Co.,
87 Wis., 1; but if connected with bodily injury such damages are recover-
able; Buth v. Nat'l Bank, 79 Mo. App., 168; even by an insane person..
Gulf, W. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Holfheuser, 45 S. W., 188. And so if the dam-.
ages are caused by the unlawful act of another; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v.
Christison, 39 Ill. App., 495; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hunter, 10 Ky.
Law Rep., 871; even in an action for breach of contract. Enders v. Skanial,
35 La. Ann., 1000. If the damage caused by the mental anguish is the-
proximate result of a legal wrong against plaintiff by defendant, a recov-
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ery is allowed on this ground. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex., 210. With the
exception of some telegraph cases, the courts seem nearly unanimous in
holding that for mental anguish alone, damages cannot be recovered.
There are two notable exceptions where the contrary is held almost as
consistently, i.e., in actions for the wrongful removal from the grave of
the body of a child, or relative in the first degree, and for the mutilation
of the body of such a relative. (Medical dissection cases.) See Cooley on
Torts, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 90; Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 267. See also
Bessamer Imp. Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala., 135. The decision in the present
case states the better rule, although there are older cases to the contrary.For other cases in point, see YALE LAw JOURNAL, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pi 60.
See also YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. XXI, No. 8, p. 685.
RAILIROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENT-DUTY OF TRAVELER-STOP, LOOIN AND
L]STN.-DANKIN V. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co., 83 ATL. (N. J.), 1006.-Held,
that a traveler crossing a railroad, though required to look and listen, is
not negligent, as a matter of law, in failing to stop before driving on the
track.
A traveler approaching a railroad crossing must exercise care and
prudence ij looking and listening for approaching trains. Cunnlinghaln v.
R. R. Co., 142 N. Y. App. Div., 303; Crabtree v. R, R. Co., 86 Neb., 33;
Row v. R., R. Co., 144 Iowa, 378. If he fails to exercise care and is coa-
sequently injured he is guilty of contributory negligence and cannot re-
cover, even though the railroad company was also negligent. R. R, Co. v,
Hall, 109 Va., 296; Weatherly v. R. R. Co., 166 Ala., 575. Wher the facts,
or the inference to be drawn from the facts, with respect to pontributory
negligence, are doubtful, the case is one for the jury. Northerp Pae. R. R.
Co.., Jones, 144 Fed., 47; Louisville R. R. Co, v Miller, 134 Ky., 716.
But where from any proper view the facts are not in dispute the question
is one for the Court. Garick v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 131 Fed., 837;
Horan v. Boston R. R. Co., 183 Fed., 559; Keller v. Erie R. R. Co., 183
N. Y., 67. Some Courts even hold that the law will presume that one
about to cross a railroad saw what he could have seen if he had looked,
and heard what he could have heard if he had listened. Malott v. Hawkinjs,
159 Ind., 127; Tiffin v. R. R. Co., 78 Ark., 55. An important case dealing
with this subject is Wallenburg v. Mo. R. R, Co., 86 Neb., 642. This case
holds that when the facts are undisputed, if from those facts different
minds Mpay bonestly conclude that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, or free therefrom, the jury, and not the Court, should draw
the inference and find the secondary fact. This case has some valuable
annotations in 37 L. R. A. (N. S.), 135.
RAILROADS-FIRES-NEGLIGENcE-BURDEN OF PROOF.-HARDY ET AL. V.
HINES BROS. LUMBER COMPANY, 75 S. E. (N. C.), 855.-Held, that the
setting of fire by sparks from defendant's locomotive, damaging plaintiff,
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being shown, makes a prima facie showing of negligence, requiring de-
fendant to overcome it.
The commonly accepted doctrine is that the mere communication oi
fire by q railroad engine is sufficient of itself to raise a prima facie pre-
sumption ggainst the company. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Marbury Lumber
Co., 125 Ala., 237. And the burden of proof is on the railroad company
to show that it was not negligent in causing the fire. Kornegay v. Railroad
Co., 154 N. C., 389. But the burden is only of proving that the company
used the best and most improved appliances. Whitp v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co:, 1 S. D., 326. In Colorado, Maine, Missqgri, Oklahoma and South
Carolina there are statutes making the railroad company absolutely liable
irrespective of negligence. The above cases hold tae modern and better
rule. The older and now obsolescent rule is that the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to show not only that the fire was caused by the sparks,
but also that the emission of such sparks was caused by the negligence of
the cpmpany. Garrett v. Southern Ry., 101 Fed., 102. For there exists no
presumption pf negligence on the part of the company in such a case. B. &
0. 41. W. R R. v. O'Brien, 38 Ind. App., 143; Babbitt v. Erie R. Co., 95
NK Y. Supp., 49. And the plaintiff must also show absence of contributory
negligence on his part. Wabash R. Co. v. Miller, 18 Ind. App., 549; Louis-
,ille, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Carmon, 20 Ind. App:, 471. But if the railroad
company pleads that its engipr- was furnishe4, with a proper spark arrester,
the bur~lef of going forward with evidencq i§ thereby shifted. Ill. Cent. R.
Co. v. Barrett, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 1755; contra, Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Cp.
v. Fenstprtpaker, 163 Ind., 534. Here the title case is clearly on the side
of the better and more modern authorities.
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT.-VIEALEY V. BEMIDJI LyMBER
Co., 136 N. W., (MINN.), 1090.-Held, that one who wrongfully interferes
pr intermeddles with the contract relation between two others, and thereby
prevents one of them from carrying out the contract, which results in loss
to the other, is liable for such loss.
Tlat a contract existing between two parties may give rise to rights
in rem, as well as rights in personam, is well established in England.
Lumpy v. Gye, 2 E. & B., 216; Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q. B., 715. It is
also @§t.blished in this country. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass., 555; Angle
v. Ctti pgo Ry. (7o., 151 U. S., 1; Londpy v. Ho rn, 206 Ill., 493. This is
denied ip a few jurisdictions. Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky., 121; Glencoe v.
Hi(4-yos, 138 Mo., 439. If the contract is one of employment the great
weight of authority is that one who induces another to break such a con-
tract is liable to the party injured thereby. Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B., 333;
Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H., 456; May v. Wood, 172 Mass., 11. Contra,
Bourlier v. Macauley, 91 Ky., 135. In contracts other than employment
the authorities are more divided. Many Courts hold that liability in tort
-for causing a breach in a contract between others does not exist outside of
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contracts of employment. Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal., 578; Raycroft v. Tayn-
for, 68 Vt., 219. But the modern tendency is strongly toward the view that
contract rights are property and are entitled to protection. Garst v. Charles,
187 Mass., 144; Tubular Rivet Co. v. Exeter Root Co., 159 Fed., 824;
Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark., 130. The gist of the action, applying both
to contracts of employment or other contracts, is the existence or non-
existence of the malicious motive. Joyce v, Great Northern Ry. Co., 100
Minn., 225; Hushie v. Triflin, 75 N. H., 345. Malice in its legal sense
means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.
Corn. v. Goodwin, 122 Mass., 19. Applying the law, as thus found, to the
principal case, it is in accord with the better opinion both in this country
and in England.
